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Eugen Bleuler’s schizophrenia—a modern 
perspective
Anke Maatz, MA, MD; Paul Hoff, MD, PhD; Jules Angst, MD
The introduction of the term and concept schizophre-
nia earned its inventor, Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleul-
er, worldwide fame. Prompted by the rejection of the 
main principle of Kraepelinian nosology, namely prog-
nosis, Bleuler’s belief in the clinical unity of what Krae-
pelin had described as dementia praecox required him 
to search for alternative characterizing features that 
would allow scientific description and classification. 
This led him to consider psychological, and to a lesser 
degree, social factors alongside an assumed underly-
ing neurobiological disease process as constitutive of 
what he then termed schizophrenia, thus making him 
an early proponent of a bio-psycho-social understand-
ing of mental illness. Reviewing Bleuler’s conception 
of schizophrenia against the background of his overall 
clinical and theoretical work, this paper provides a crit-
ical overview of Bleuler’s key nosological principles and 
links his work with present-day debates about natural-
ism, essentialism, and stigma.            
© 2015, AICH – Servier Research Group Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2015;17:43-49.
Introduction
 Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) was born and raised 
in the village of Zollikon near Zurich in Switzerland. 
After graduating in medicine, he started his residential 
training in psychiatry at the Waldau Hospital in Bern. 
Study trips took him to Paris to work with Jean-Martin 
Charcot, to Munich where he trained under Bernhard 
von Gudden, and to London. He completed his residen-
tial training at the University Hospital of Psychiatry in 
Zurich, known as “Burghölzli,” and was appointed di-
rector of the mental asylum of Rheinau in 1886. After 
living with and caring for long-term psychiatric patients 
in Rheinau for more than 12 years, he returned to Zu-
rich as professor of psychiatry at Burghölzli in 1898, and 
held this position until his retirement in 1927. Eugen 
Bleuler died in Zollikon in 1939.
 Whilst today Bleuler is perhaps best known for the 
introduction of the term and concept schizophrenia, or 
more precisely “the group of schizophrenias,” this pa-
per considers his work on schizophrenia principally in 
terms of its relationship to long-standing and complex 
theoretical debates in psychiatric nosology. These con-
cern the very nature of mental illness, in particular the 
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relationships between nature and mind and the individ-
ual and society. Debates about how nature, ie, the brain 
and body, is related to the mind were highly topical with 
regard to mental illness in Bleuler’s time and remain so 
today,1,2 as nicely captured in Lipowski’s interrogative: 
“Psychiatry: mindless or brainless, both or neither?”3 
Bleuler would have sided neither with a mindless nor 
with a brainless psychiatry, but would have acknowl-
edged both brain and mind, as well as social factors, as 
equally important elements in mental health and illness. 
He can thus be considered an early proponent of a bio-
psychosocial model4 in psychiatry. Reviewing Bleuler’s 
conception of schizophrenia against the background of 
his overall clinical and theoretical work and contrasting 
it with Kraepelin’s earlier concept dementia praecox, 
this paper provides a critical overview of Bleuler’s key 
nosological principles and links his work with present-
day debates about naturalism, essentialism, and stigma.
Bleuler’s contribution to nosology
Bleuler’s intellectual background
Bleuler’s work stands in the conceptually rich tradi-
tion of turn-of-the-century psychiatry and psychology 
and can be considered a synthesis of various contem-
porary concepts and theories (see ref 5 for an over-
view). Amongst these are the theories of Emil Krae-
pelin (1856-1926) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), 
who, through their different theoretical emphases, in-
troduced him to two—in one view opposed, in another 
complementary—traditions in psychiatry.6,7 
 Emil Kraepelin promoted the biological tradition, 
viewing mental illnesses as “natural disease entities” 
(natürliche Krankheitseinheiten), ie, entities “given by 
nature”8 and existing independently from the psychiat-
ric practitioner and researcher. Acknowledging that sci-
ence at the time did not yet allow identification of these 
posited disease entities, he based his preliminary nosol-
ogy on an alternative principle, namely—following Karl 
Ludwig Kahlbaum (1828-1899)9—on the course and 
prognosis of a given illness. This led to a dichotomous 
nosology based on the distinction between the concept 
of dementia praecox, characterized by a fatal course, 
and the concept of manic-depressive insanity, charac-
terized by a positive course.10,11 This nosological system 
had gained wide acceptance amongst psychiatrists by 
the turn of the century.
 At the same time, Sigmund Freud, founder of psy-
choanalysis, struggled to find recognition for his new 
concepts in academic psychiatry. Also rooted in a bio-
logical tradition, yet offering a new psychological ex-
planation of mental illness as the unfolding of uncon-
scious intrapsychic conflicts,12 Freud’s theory was met 
with skepticism, if not outright rejection, as a dogmatic 
world-view.13 Bleuler was the only influential contem-
porary academic psychiatrist who not only joined in 
the debate about psychoanalysis, but also, while always 
remaining circumspect, implemented psychoanalytic 
treatment and research at Burghölzli.14,15 
 Bleuler’s thinking was further shaped by the Ger-
man philosopher and psychologist Johann Friedrich 
Herbart (1776-1841). Championing a scientific ap-
proach to psychology, Herbart was one of the major 
proponents of association theory. This saw human men-
tal life as consisting in a multitude of basic, individual 
mental acts that are combined (“associated”) into more 
complex cognitive functions.16 As will be shown in the 
following section, Bleuler, like the Viennese psychia-
trist Erwin Stransky (1877-1962),17,18 integrated aspects 
of this atomistic approach to psycho(patho)logy in his 
work on dementia praecox and its reconceptualization 
as schizophrenia.
Introducing the “group of schizophrenias”
In 1908, Bleuler publicly introduced the term and con-
cept schizophrenia in a lecture given at the meeting of 
the Deutscher Verein für Psychatrie (German Psychiat-
ric Association) in Berlin.19 In the opening paragraph, 
he summarized his reasons for abandoning Kraepelin’s 
earlier concept dementia praecox:
  I wish to emphasize that in Kraepelin’s dementia praecox 
it is neither a question of an essential dementia nor of a 
necessary precociousness. For this reason, and because 
from the expression dementia praecox one cannot form 
further adjectives nor substantives, I am taking the lib-
erty of employing the word schizophrenia for revising the 
Kraepelinian concept. In my opinion the breaking up or 
splitting of psychic functioning is an excellent symptom of 
the whole group […]19 (translation from ref 20)
Whilst this passage also underscores the importance of 
linguistic labels in psychiatry, the wish to rename Krae-
pelin’s dementia praecox is only a secondary motive in 
Bleuler’s introduction of schizophrenia. Having gath-
ered epidemiological data on the prognosis and end 
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states of patients admitted with a diagnosis of dementia 
praecox, he came to the conclusion that this group of 
patients could not be coherently defined by a specific 
prognosis, ie, that this Kraepelinian nosological princi-
ple had to be rejected.21 Importantly, however, Bleuler 
wanted to maintain the nosological unity of the group 
of patients that Kraepelin identified by dementia prae-
cox and believed that there was something “specifically 
schizophrenic behind the general manifestations” of the 
disease.19 He shared Kraepelin’s assumption of an un-
derlying physical disease process that the sciences of his 
day could not yet identify, and—having rejected Krae-
pelin’s principle of prognosis—he set about searching 
for alternative criteria to define the essence of schizo-
phrenia. To this purpose, Bleuler turned to psychol-
ogy, where, influenced by Herbart’s atomistic view of 
the mind,16 he identified the alteration of associations, 
ie, of the way in which basic mental acts meaningfully 
combine into more complex units, as schizophrenia’s 
most fundamental feature. This idea is more fully devel-
oped in Bleuler’s 1911 volume Dementia Praecox or the 
Group of Schizophrenias22:
  The connections between associations are lost. The dis-
ease interrupts the threads that give direction to our 
thoughts in an irregular fashion, sometimes affecting only 
a few, sometimes a large proportion of them. Thus, the re-
sult of the thought process is rendered unusual, and often 
logically incorrect (p 10, translation AM).
In this volume, Bleuler develops a symptomatology 
organized around two dichotomous distinctions: that 
between basic and accessory and that between primary 
and secondary symptoms. Basic symptoms are those 
which are necessarily present in any case of schizophre-
nia; accessory symptoms may or may not occur. The 
distinction of primary and secondary refers to both eti-
ology and pathogenesis, with primary symptoms being 
caused directly by the assumed neurobiological disease 
process, whilst secondary symptoms are seen as the 
potentially understandable reactions of the psyche to 
the disturbing primary symptoms. The alteration of as-
sociations is the only symptom that Bleuler regarded 
as both basic and primary, and can thus be described 
as the core disturbance in the Bleulerian conception of 
schizophrenia. Importantly, the alteration of associa-
tions is not to be equated with formal thought disorder 
but to be understood as a disturbance affecting all as-
pects, both cognitive and affective, of mental life.23 Also, 
Bleuler was keen to stress that the alteration of associa-
tions had been identified by empirical observation, not 
by theoretical speculation,19 and that it was accessible 
to experimental testing.23 Two other phenomena that 
Bleuler characterized as basic (but not primary) symp-
toms were ambivalence and autism. By ambivalence, he 
understood the simultaneous presence of contradictory 
ideas and emotions; autism described the phenomenon 
of a patient’s getting lost in personal ideas, emotions, 
and intentions without being able to adapt to the exter-
nal reality, resulting in a reduction of communication. 
 Linking Bleuler’s implementation of psychoana-
lytic, or more generally psychodynamic, ideas, with his 
distinction between primary and secondary symptoms 
and thus to the interaction between brain/body and 
mind, a further distinction has to be introduced, namely 
that between form and content. Bleuler himself did not 
systematically introduce nor use this distinction, but it 
is implicit in his statement that what is psychologically 
understandable is the content of schizophrenic symp-
toms,24 ie, why a specific hallucination or delusion oc-
curs. As the following quotation makes clear, he thus 
assumed a neurobiological disease process giving rise 
to a primary symptom, the alteration of associations, to 
which—understandably—the psyche reacts giving rise 
to secondary symptoms, with individually meaningful 
content: 
  It goes without saying that the disease process cannot give 
rise to the complex psychological symptoms which we are 
accustomed to consider first and foremost. This process 
cannot account for the fact that it is a specific delusional 
idea or a specific hallucination that occurs. The process 
can only lead to certain fundamental disturbances of the 
psyche on the basis of which, in conjunction with precipi-
tating and determining factors, hallucinations and delu-
sional ideas emerge.19 (p. 455, translation AM).
The characterization of schizophrenic symptoms as 
bearing individually meaningful content is one of the 
important novelties in Bleuler’s understanding of 
schizophrenia. In the words of his son Manfred Bleuler:
  One of Bleuler’s main aims in choosing and following his 
career was to arrive at an understanding of schizophrenic 
symptoms as expressions of an inner psychodynamic life. 
[…] He studied the schizophrenic’s life essentially in the 
same way as we study the inner life of neurotics, of healthy 
men, and of ourselves.25
In his summary of the development of the schizophre-
nia concept at the Burghölzli hospital over the course 
of nearly 70 years (1902-1971),26 Manfred Bleuler ex-
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panded on this attitude and orientation so central to his 
father’s work: he stressed that the view of schizophrenic 
symptoms as secondary phenomena, ie, understand-
able intellectually and emotionally, also made them in 
principle accessible to therapy. Such therapy consisted 
of two pillars, firstly personal communication (today 
analytically oriented psychotherapy) in order to help 
patients by understanding their intentions and skills in 
adapting to reality; and secondly multiple joint activi-
ties, such as work and leisure activities in groups of pa-
tients. During his time at the Rheinau Psychiatric Hos-
pital, Eugen Bleuler devoted as much time as possible 
to such personal contacts with his patients; later, during 
his years at Burghölzli, he suffered severely from a lack 
of time to do this. 
 Unlike Kraepelin, then, Bleuler saw no contradiction 
between the assumption of an underlying neurobiologi-
cal disease process and the assumption of psychological 
understandability, but integrated both in his conception 
of schizophrenia. The nosological divide between psy-
chotic and neurotic disorders, commonly drawn along 
the line of biologically determined versus psychologi-
cally understandable disease, is thus blurred. In the light 
of his keen awareness of social factors in the course of 
the disease and his efforts to address those therapeuti-
cally,27,28 Bleuler can thus be seen as an early proponent 
of a bio-psychosocial understanding of mental illness. 
 Whilst the belief in a “specifically schizophrenic” 
feature spurred Bleuler’s reconceptualization, he was 
anxious to leave his concept open for scientific revision 
and to accommodate the possibility that such a unifying 
feature might indeed not exist. He therefore spoke cau-
tiously of “the group of schizophrenias” and intended 
his account to be a preliminary one.
 Bleuler’s nosological changes were met with enthu-
siasm by some, with criticism by others, and the recep-
tion of his work varied between countries—ie, psychi-
atric cultures. Whilst in Switzerland, for example, the 
concept of schizophrenia was quickly adopted, it was 
criticized in Germany for carrying too much psychoan-
alytical baggage and for relying on the poorly defined 
concept of association. In Britain, where Kraepelin’s 
prognosis-based nosology had been criticized early 
on for promoting therapeutic nihilism and unjusti-
fied “counsels of despair,”29 the reception of Bleuler’s 
schizophrenia was impeded by its perceived close con-
nection with Kraepelin’s dementia praecox. Once the 
break with Kraepelinian nosology implicit in the new 
concept was recognized, this latter aspect was especially 
welcomed.30 Later the concept was developed further, 
giving rise to derivative concepts, such as schizoid-
ism.31-33 Later the concept was developed further, giving 
rise to derivative concepts such as schizoidism, which, 
whilst present in Bleuler’s work on schizophrenia from 
the outset, was only explicitly introduced under that la-
bel by Kurt Binswanger (1887-1981) in 1920.31
Bleuler’s later work
Bleuler’s later writings on general psychology and phi-
losophy received little attention from either his contem-
poraries or later workers. This may be due to the rather 
speculative, and in parts obscure, nature of works like 
Psychoids: Organizing Principle of Organic Develop-
ment34 or “Mnemism and psychoids.”35 In these works, 
Bleuler proposes a comprehensive “life science” in 
which physical, mental, and social phenomena are not 
seen as separate or even opposed, but as equal aspects 
of a single integrative life principle.36 In the light of the 
portrayal of Bleuler as a proponent of a bio-psychoso-
cial understanding of mental illness given above, these 
works might be interpreted as his attempt to theorize 
the relation and interaction between brain/body, mind 
and the social sphere.
Discussion and conclusion
When we examine Bleuler’s intellectual background 
and the major theoretical debates in psychiatry around 
the turn of the century, it is hard not to notice important 
similarities with ongoing debates today. 
 Born of the rejection of Kraepelin’s principle of 
prognosis, on which his dementia praecox was based, 
the view of a variety of possible courses of schizophre-
nia, often summarized in a simplified manner as a rule 
of thirds, belongs to the stock-in-trade of present-day 
psychiatry. 
 Yet current debates about renaming schizophrenia 
would seem to suggest that the Kraepelinian under-
standing still lingers amongst professionals and lay per-
sons alike: one of the declared aims of renaming schizo-
phrenia in Japan, for instance, was to replace the view 
of an incurable condition by one associated with thera-
peutic optimism, in other words, to replace a Kraepelin-
ian by a Bleulerian understanding. This, it was hoped, 
would enable better access to psychiatric care and re-
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duce stigma.37,38 Why, one might ask, was the Bleulerian 
understanding not taken up from the outset? We shall 
return to this question later after first reconsidering 
other features of Bleuler’s concept. 
 Stemming from the search for something “specifi-
cally schizophrenic,” Bleuler’s approach stands in the 
tradition of essentialist views of mental illness, to which 
it further contributes through the identification of the 
alteration of associations as “schizophrenia’s clinical 
core.”39 Whilst not explicitly addressing its phenomeno-
logical status, ie, the question of whether this core dis-
turbance has itself phenomenal quality, Bleuler was ad-
amant that it was not a theoretically inferred construct, 
but a phenomenon open to empirical observation and 
testing.19 He thus challenges the view recently put for-
ward by Mishara and Schwartz,40 that only nonessen-
tialist, phenomenological accounts of mental illness can 
provide hypotheses that can be tested by experimental 
neuroscience. With regard to the relationship between 
neurobiological and psychological understandings 
and approaches in psychiatry, it seems that whilst psy-
chological theories and therapeutic approaches have 
gained recognition in research and treatment, there is 
currently a strong tendency to naturalize the mind, ie, to 
hold the mind to be exhausted by nature as understood 
by the natural sciences.41 Efforts to naturalize mental 
illness come in many forms, and are observable not only 
in psychiatry but in all the mind sciences, including psy-
chology and philosophy (of mind).2,42,43 Despite these 
efforts, the authors of the latest edition of the Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
5)44 have not included biomarkers, regarding them as 
still incapable of carving nature at its joints, ie, correctly 
and reliably identifying natural disease entities. More-
over, the ontological and epistemological status of such 
markers remains unclear.45
 This leaves current psychiatry in a position very 
much akin to Bleuler’s: whilst a neurobiological basis 
of mental illness is generally taken for granted, it is not 
considered to provide a sufficiently firm foundation for 
a psychiatric nosology. Bleuler’s theoretical position re-
garding this question is not altogether clear. In the work 
on schizophrenia he assumes a neurobiological process 
underlying the disturbance, without in any way—etio-
logically, diagnostically, or therapeutically—reducing 
the disturbance to the brain process. He was aware of 
the variable familial occurrence of schizophrenia and 
convinced of the role of genetic factors, but his work did 
not focus on biological causes of schizophrenia but on 
symptoms, their meanings and their personal and social 
consequences.
 This suggests that he embraced a kind of non-elim-
inative naturalism, whilst in his later work he seems to 
have turned, or to have been in search of, some form of 
mind-body identity theory. Although these theoretical 
questions remain unresolved, Bleuler’s clinical position 
was clear. In his patient-oriented attitude he displayed 
an early understanding of mental illness as bio-psycho-
socially constituted, and thus needing to be therapeu-
tically addressed on all three levels. Such understand-
ing has proven clinically useful and therefore become 
common sense in medicine generally, even though a 
theoretically satisfying explanatory model for this bio-
psychosocial understanding is still lacking.46
 To return to the question posed earlier, namely, why 
was Bleuler’s construct of schizophrenia as accessible 
to understanding and therapy not taken up from the 
outset?
 Might the sheer multidimensionality of his concep-
tion of schizophrenia, which remains hard to grasp 
when compared with Kraepelin’s clear-cut dementia 
praecox, have impeded acceptance? Or is it, that re-
gardless of the theoretical conception, the phenom-
ena observed in schizophrenia point to something so 
utterly unfamiliar that despite all knowledge to the 
contrary, a pessimistic prognosis is easily assumed? Or 
again, has the difficulty in overcoming therapeutic ni-
hilism and stigmatization less to do with the phenom-
enon itself and more with society’s general tendency 
to search for and define the Other? These remain open 
questions, but ones that need to be taken into account 
when considering and reconsidering the nosological 
status of schizophrenia and psychiatric nosology more 
broadly.  o
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La esquizofrenia de Eugen Bleuler: una 
perspectiva moderna
Con la introducción del término y concepto de esquizo-
frenia su inventor, el psiquiatra suizo Eugen Bleuler, ob-
tuvo fama mundial. Como Bleuler rechazó el principio 
fundamental de la nosología de Kraepelin, que se basa-
ba en el pronóstico, su idea acerca de la unidad clínica de 
lo que Kraepelin había descrito como demencia precoz 
lo obligó a buscar otros rasgos característicos que per-
mitieran una clasificación y descripción científicas. Esto 
lo llevó a considerar factores psicológicos y en menor 
medida factores sociales junto con suponer un proceso 
patológico neurobiológico subyacente como constitu-
tivo de lo que él entonces denominó esquizofrenia, lo 
que hizo de él un precoz defensor de una comprensión 
bio-psico-social de la enfermedad mental. Este artículo 
entrega una visión crítica de los principios nosológicos 
clave de Bleuler al revisar su concepto de esquizofrenia 
junto con los antecedentes de todo su trabajo clínico y 
teórico, y relaciona su trabajo con los debates actuales 
acerca del naturalismo, el esencialismo y el estigma.  
La schizophrénie d’Eugen Bleuler, une perspective 
moderne
Grâce à l’introduction du terme et du concept de schi-
zophrénie, son inventeur, le psychiatre suisse Eugen 
Bleuler, est mondialement connu. Comme Bleuler reje-
tait l’idée principale de la nosologie Kraepelinienne, à 
savoir le pronostic, sa foi en l’ensemble clinique de ce 
que Kraepelin a décrit comme démence précoce l’obli-
gea à rechercher des traits caractéristiques alternatifs 
permettant une classification et une description scienti-
fiques. Ceci le conduisit à prendre en compte les facteurs 
psychologiques et dans une moindre mesure, sociaux, 
à côté d’un processus pathologique neurobiologique 
sous-jacent supposé comme constitutif de ce qu’il a en-
suite appelé schizophrénie, faisant donc de lui un des 
premiers défenseurs d’une compréhension bio-psycho-
sociale de la maladie mentale. En examinant la concep-
tion de Bleuler sur la schizophrénie par rapport au fond 
de son travail global clinique et théorique, cet article 
présente un aperçu majeur des principes nosologiques 
clés de Bleuler et associe son travail aux débats actuels 
sur le naturalisme, l’essentialisme et la stigmatisation. 
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